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CHAIRMAN'S
MESSAGE
Support Your Local Professor
of Administrative Law
O ne of the strengths of American law
schools, often envied by observers from
other systems, is their close association with
the practicing bar, producing an education
that combines the practical and the theoreti-
..... cal, the academic and the pragmatic. To a
large degree this is an historical accident, at-
tributable to the fact that our first law schools,
unlike the European law faculties, did not
grow out of the universities themselves but
ANTONIN SCALIA were founded and staffed by practicing
lawyers. They were in academia, but not entirely of it.
It is a phenomenon well known to the world's diplomatic corps that
foreign service officers left too long in a single post will often "go
native," reflecting the attitudes and outlooks of the country to which
they are accredited rather than of their own. Some believe that our law
faculties have fallen victim to a similar sort of complaint-becoming
too "academic," rejecting some of the most closely held values of the
bar, and even failing any longer to teach the skills needed for practice. I
do not share that view. But I do believe that retaining the close rela-
tionship between the teaching and the practice is a difficult and impor-
tant goal that merits and requires constant attention. Which leads me
to think that the readers of this journal would be interested-or, if not,
should be interested-in a few remarks concerning the current
teaching of administrative law.
The subject is prompted by my recent attendance at a workshop for
professors of administrative law held under the auspices of the Amer-
ican Association of Law Schools. It was appropriately entitled
"Teaching Administrative Law," and more imaginatively subtitled, by
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one of my more puckish colleagues, "Ad Law Nauseam." It was held in
New Orleans on March 5-6, a datum which makes it difficult at the
outset for charges of impracticality to be levelled against this particular
group of legal academics-or at least for such charges to be levelled by
the ABA, which found itself in New Orleans in August (not to mention
Chicago in January).
The workshop demonstrated that in at least one important respect
the teaching of administrative law resembles its practice. You may
recall that our Section Council, at its fall meeting, rejected a proposal to
establish standards and criteria for the practice specialty of administra-
tive law, principally for the reason that the field is too diverse. Well, you
will be happy to learn that we professors can be no more precise about
what it means to teach administrative law than you practitioners can be
about what it means to practice it. Indeed, the very first panel was
plaintively entitled "What Are We Trying to Do?"
Large portions of our subject can be said to have been filched from
other courses. Or perhaps more accurately claimed as abandoned
property, left behind by professors of constitutional law who in recent
years have acquired too much paraphernalia to keep track of. I have in
mind particularly the portion of the course dealing with the constitu-
tional due process requirements applicable to administrative action-
everything from City of Denver to Goldberg v. Kelly. This could be taught
as well in a constitutional law course, and sometimes is. Similarly, the
portion of the course (or of my course, at least) dealing with separation
of powers and so-called independent regulatory agencies-Schechter,
Humphrey's Executor and all of that. These topics get increasingly short
shrift in the crowded constitutional law curriculum, and when I am
Commissar of Education I shall consign them all to administrative law,
where they can be treated in the context of an overall examination of
executive action.
Another topic which, as the workshop disclosed, some but not all of
us ad law professors pinch from other courses is the doctrine of
standing. It is central to the constitutional role of thejudiciary, and so is
logically treatable in the course on constitutional law or federal courts.
On the other hand, an increasing proportion of the significant stand-
ing cases-from SCRAP to Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. to
Goldwater v. Carter-involves attempted challenges to executive action.
And if the doctrine is central to the role of the courts, it is also central to
the role of the executive, since when all executive action becomes
challengeable in court the duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully
executed" is entirely converted from the ultimate responsibility of the
President to the ultimate responsibility of the courts. Moreover, much
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of the modern development in the law of standing consists of statutory
conferral of standing, through the APA and various substantive stat-
utes. It is difficult to study the subject apart from these administrative
law developments. So I shall require this to be taught in the Ad Law
course as well; and those obstinate professors at the workshop who
persist in their disagreement will be set to teaching the UCC.
But surely, you say, there must be agreement upon some core of
administrative law that everyone must teach, and that is not purloined
from other courses. Yes, there is. We can all huddle about the APA-
and some of us (myself not included) can even draw warmth from a
mystical common law of administrative process, separate from the
requirements of either Constitution or statute, developed by the courts
(except, apparently, the Supreme Court-see Vermont Yankee). And
there is a substantial body of law to be taught regarding judicial review
of administrative action (though much of that, dealing with so-called
"scope of review" could plausibly be said to have been purloined from a
long-vanished course called "Poetry in the Law"). But the problem with
these properly proprietary topics is that it is difficult to teach them-
and perhaps impossible to teach them accurately-apart from the
substantive fields of law to which they are appended. One can teach, to
be sure, the minimal requirements of the APA; indeed, one can do that
in about a week. But to know the APA rulemaking requirements is not
to know rulemaking as it exists in almost any of the major regulatory
agencies. And judicial review makes more sense (the subtopic "scope of
review" perhaps only makes any sense) when one considers a series of
decisions dealing with a single agency rather than cases ranging from
the Department of Defense to the FCC.
Hence the continuing and never-to-be-resolved dispute in the
teaching of administrative law, evident at this workshop as at all others:
Should the students be immersed in the business of a particular
agency-whether EPA, or the FTC or the FCC; or should they rather
be given a Cooke's Tour of cases and case studies from various agen-
cies? Personally, I favor the latter approach. Partly because I believe
that one of the most important things an educated lawyer must experi-
ence (and not merely be told) is the wondrous diversity of administra-
tive practice; and partly for the somewhat contradictory reason that the
search for and emphasis upon commonality is essential to facilitate
dispersal of the best practices, and to prevent a centrifugal field from
becoming utterly chaotic. But I may be wrong.
The workshop displayed a healthy receptivity to the teachings of
other disciplines. One of the sessions dealt with the lessons that admin-
istrative law theory may usefully learn from sociology, political science
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and organization theory. Well, yes, it was somewhat theoretical. And
no, I doubt whether any of our graduates will be able to use any of that
good stuff in the first memo they are assigned. But one of the functions
of academic study (and teaching) of the law is rationalization and
improvement as well as description of the status quo. Somebody has to be
doing the groundwork for the next revision of the APA. If not we, then
OMB.
In any case, any practitioners who may be upset at such extra-legal
innovation will be comforted (as I was) by another remarkable phe-
nomenon. One of the points I made in a short presentation concerning
the teaching of rulemaking was the importance of historical perspec-
tive. The lamp of the past lighting the future, and so forth. To my great
disappointment, I found that I was preaching to the choir. There was
general agreement that it is important to teach not only what the law
now is, but also how it came to be so. Only in this way will students
appreciate that the law in this rapidly developing field may be as
different from today's fifteen years from now as it was fifteen years
ago; and only in this way will they be enabled to make some informed
calculations as to what the nature of the changes may be.
But there was some bad news at the workshop as well. One of the
most discomfitting presentations was made by our Council member,
Prof. Arthur Bonfield, who urged an increased emphasis upon the
teaching of state administrative law. He is unquestionably right-and
was right even before the advent of the New Federalism which prom-
ises to shift a greater proportion of administration to the states, and a
greater proportion of our graduates to practice before state agencies.
What is discomfitting is that our lack is not merely the teaching of it but
the knowing of it. Except for Arthur and Harold Levinson (also a
member of our Council) and Fred Davis (formerly a member of our
Council) there are few law teachers who know very much about state
administrative law. Perhaps the market is about to remedy that short-
age.
Finally, I must note that in accordance with the tradition of bar-gown
collegiality that I referred to at the beginning of this essay, the work-
shop had an administrative law practitioner as luncheon speaker. You
would have been proud of him. It was as though he had been sent over
by Central Casting, in response to a request for an impressive lawyer
who would say to all these professors just what John Q. Adlawpracti-
tioner would want to say. Peter Barton Hutt, former General Counsel
of FDA, gave it to us good. His theme was that we were too other-
worldly, and the line from his talk that I most vividly recall was to the
effect that in his real-life practice he considers it a failure if his dealings
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with an agency ever reach a stage (formal adjudication or rulemaking,
much less judicial review) where any thing he learned in law school
would be useful. He is probably right. A successful ad law practice
consists, as he said, of knowing the agency, its institutional history,
incentives and proclivities, intimately, and of persuading its staff-
often at relatively low levels of authority-that particular action is or is
not in the public interest. I am skeptical that we can possibly teach such
skills in a general administrative law course; but we should at least be
conveying the message that those skills are necessary, and that the
client's battle is usually won or lost at a stage before the legal rules make
any difference.
Random and unscientific observation causes me to remark that over
the years the practicing bar and the teaching professoriate have en-
joyed a much closer relationship in the field of administrative law than
in most other fields. Many of the most prominent administrative law
scholars-Walter Gellhorn, K. C. Davis, Nat Nathanson, Carl Au-
erbach, Clark Byse, to name only a few-have been active in the work
of this Section. No less than five law professors are currently members
of our Council. I do not know what accounts for this unusually high
degree of affinity. Perhaps it is that people who understand adminis-
trative law appreciate the importance of institutions and the efficacy of
person-to-person contacts. And perhaps they are more aware that
everything they need to know is not to be found in the case reports.
Whatever the cause, I view it as a desirable phenomenon, and I hope
that the practitioners among you think so as well.
You would be, I believe, pleased with the current company of ad law
teachers-judging, at least, by their representation in New Orleans.
They are, by and large, undoctrinaire, inquisitive, eager that what they
teach be not only true but also generally useful to their students in the
practice. They have none of that disdain for the practice which some-
times creeps into the academy. They merit an interest on your part in
their enterprise which matches theirs in yours.
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